CURRENT POPULAR OPINION

3/8/63

ON U.S. CUBA POLICY

Four recent surveys of American popular attitudes on Cuba policy have presented results which at first glance seem somewhat contradictory:

Public Opposes Invasion-Gallup Poll, Feb. 27 (nationwide interviews);

Public Less Worried Than Politicians-N.Y. Times, Feb. 27 (reporters in 10 American cities):

Short Of War Measures Supported-Samuel Lubell, Mar. 1 (interviews in 18 states);

Public Favors Tough Policy--Minnasota Poll, Mar. 3 (statewide poll).

However, detailed analysis of these four inquiries yields a fairly coherent picture of the current opinion situation.

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A majority regard Cubs as a serious threat, but only 1 in 5 favors invasion of Cubs now, according to the Gallup Poll figures.

59%-Serious Threat		315 Not serious	No Op.
20%-Invede	64% Against In	wasion Now	No Opin.

Serious Threat The Minnesota and Gallup Polls are in close agreement in finding belief that the Cuban threat is serious.

Gallup-59%-31% split on whether Cuba "seriously threatens world peace"

Minnesota-58%-33% split on whether Cuba presently "threatens U.S. security."

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When the Minnesota Poll asked the 50% how serious a threat they saw in Cuba, 34% of the total said "very serious" and 21% said "not too serious."

No anic "At no time," wrote Camuel Lubell, "have I found in my interviewing anything like panic or hysteria over the extent of the Soviet military build-up in the Caribbean." Similarly, the New York Times concluded: "The public is not as worried about developments (in Cuba) as are the politicians."

Support for a U.S. invasion appears actually to have declined slightly, according to the Gallup Poll, as compared to mid-October 1962 (when 24% favored invasion) or at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

Approve Kennedy Both Gallup and Hinnesota Polls find majority Handling To Now approval of the Administration's handling of the Cubs problem.

Callup found 56% "satisfied" with the handling "in recent weeks." and 28% "dissatisfied." However, there were unusual differences in responses according to party preference. While satisfaction was registered by Democrats (69% to 16%) and by Independents (55% to 29%), Republicans registered a "dissatisfied" plurality (45% vs. 36%).

Asking about a longer period, the Hinnesota Poll found 66% approving handling of the Cuban situation since the Kennedy Administration "took office in January 1961." This represented a decline from the 81% voicing approval in December 1962.

A partisan difference was also evident in Minnesota where "more than 8 out of 10 Democratic-Farser-Laborites" approved, and "more than 7 out of 10 independent voters." But Republicans registered a margin of "disapproval" (46% vs. 41%).

Should U.S. Do Americans oppose an invasion—and Anything Now?

Gallup reports virtually no partisan differences on this issue, do they want the U.S. to just "sit tight"?

Newspaper editorials demanding "complete Soviet withdrawal from Cuba" were noted in the New York Times survey as continuing in the Hidwest. (POS receipts show such demands from all parts of the country.) The Times survey also reported that "Southerners generally favored a somewhat stronger approach to Cuban problems, without specifying what."

- 3 -

Samuel Lubell stresses his belief that Americans feel that "this is the time to act against a threat that is expected to get worse." Lubell adds a related finding, "a dramatic drop in the fear of Soviet retaliation"—from 2 out of 3 last September expecting that dispatch of American troops to Cuba would lead to war with Russia to 1 out of 3 holding such an expectation today. As to specific American wishes Lubell said: "Cenerally people think the President should reinstitute last October's blockade and demand the evacuation of all Russian troops."

Demand Russians Withdraw? The Minnesota Poll asked a series of 3 questions relating to a possible U.S. demand for removal of Russian "troops and weapons" from Cubs.

78%-U.S. should "demand" troop removal

55%-Invade if they refuse

365-Even if War

It is hardly surprising that Americans, earnestly desiring that the Russians go, and less fearful of Russian retaliation, should favor a U.S. "desend" for withdrawal. Having put themselves on record with the interviewer as favoring such a demand, most of these respondents went along with the idea of invading Cuba in case of a refusal. But when asked to assume that such an invasion "might bring on war with Russia," only 36% of the total supported an invasion policy.

A significant sex difference is noted by the Minnesota Poll. While men and women equally favored the demand for withdrawal, men were much more favorable to a Cuban invasion in the event of refusal (62% of man, 47% of women). On the supposition of a war with Russia, the difference was even greater: 46% of the men still favored invasion, only 25% of the women.

Salient Peatures Of Current Attitude

Several elements of the current opinion picture respecting Cuba policy may be highlighted.

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- 1- The U.S. position of unwillingness to accept the indefinite presence of Russian military force in Cuba seems to have virtually unanimous support-although a minority (11% in Minnesota) currently oppose a U.S. "demand" for withdrawal.
- 2- But demands for drastic action now are limited to a minority. Many appear content, for the time being, with the Kennedy policy of "watchful waiting." Some trust the Administration to act again, if necessary, at the right time.
- 3- Still, a "more active approach" would be welcome to most, including many of the majority who oppose an invasion now. Desire for more action has been noted by the New York Times in the South; and the pells make it clear that in the North this desire is widespread and is predominant among rank-and-file Republicans.
- for reinstitution of a quarantine. A few have suggested a blockade designed to prevent the export of Cuban arms to other Hemisphere points. Others call for the complete "isolation"—diplomatic, political, economic—of Cuba by all other GAS nations.
- 5- The present majority "satisfaction" with U.S. policy is likely to dwindle-unless the public feels that the U.S. is taking appropriate concrete action to bring about the end of the Eussian menace in Cuba.

Character Of Current

Tublic Discussion

Tively little concrete discussion of what would be the advantages—and especially the costs—of particular "next steps," such as a demand for Russian withdrawal, reinstitution of the Catober quarantine, an CAS blockade to enforce Cuba's isolation, a U.S.—or CAS—invasion of Cuba. (Walter Lippmann's recent column stands out as an unusual exception.)

"double danger" for the Administration: "One is for Administration leaders to conclude on the basis of this evanescent public support that all is well; the other is to assume that the public really understands the issues or what the paverament proposes to do about them."

- 5 -

Suggestions for Information Activity

- 1- It should be made clear to the public that the U.S. Government is not "merely waiting." Fublic statements should continue to make the point that the U.S. is not prepared to wait indefinitely for the withdrawal of Eussian military forces—even though an ultimatum to Hoscow is regarded as unwise.
- 2- It should also be made clear that the Government is actively weighing various alternative measures. (Possibly a meeting at which several members of Congress could discuss various measures with Executive officials would help to show the Government's active search for the best "next steps.")
- 3- A background briefing for a limited number of columnists might stimulate thoughtful press articles surveying the realistic possibilities and their relative chances of succeeding.
- 4- As Department spokesmen comment on ourrent developments, they might continue to emphasize the circumstances which produced success for the U.S. stand of last October in terms of securing unanimous support from our OAS and NATO allies.
- 5- The present seems better than any future time for the public discussion of alternative measures respecting Cuba. The continued presence of Russians (and of Castro) in Cuba-apart from the daily possibility of some new untoward developmentis likely to diminish the degree of confidence now vested in the Administration. It seems more prudent to discuss alternative measures now than in response to some fresh "incident."

Prepared by Public Opinion Studies Staff Bureau of Public Affairs 3/8/63

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